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Loya Paktia is very much embedded in tribal traditions and its social organization still regulated by the customary law known as Pashtunwali. Compared to other parts of Afghanistan, the region has long benefited from strong and cohesive tribal structures. Indeed, tribes in this part of the country are traditionally the largest permanent political and social units, where elites (khans, maliks) and notables (spin giri) hold great influence.While the integrity of these institutions has steadily eroded since the jihad against the Soviet occupation, until relatively recently, security at both the district and provincial levels in Loya Paktia were guaranteed by agreements among tribes, and between tribes and the government. The Afghan government still relies in certain  areas on tribes to provide community-based policing (arbakai).

This said, several windows of opportunity have been lost since 2001 when district councils and tribal leaders were willing to join forces with the Afghan government in order to broker a meaningful partnership in the area of governance and security. Security has deteriorated to such an extent in the past few years (and most notably since 2005) that tribes can no longer guarantee the full security of their communities or their land. Agreements between tribes and the government have come under increasing pressure and the insurgency forces traditional tribal leaders to disengage from the Afghan government with numerous incidences of threats and assassinations. As a consequence, people across the Southeast region no longer view the security, neither in the districts or provincial centers. Against this backdrop, elders in Loya Paktia are being asked to support a peace and reintegration initiative between insurgents and the government both locally and at the national level. However, the outcome of the process could be undermined given that the actors in the Southeast who should ultimately be a part of a reconciliation and reintegration process (i.e. the government, tribes, the International Military) have either been weakened, have poor relations or view each other with mistrust.

This policy paper discusses the problematic relations between these main actors, why reconciliation initiatives to date have failed in the Southeast, and puts forward some practical suggestions to ensure a more effective strategy.

Summary

• While the local population considers the idea of reconciliation as a good and necessary one at this juncture, it is unclear what this will mean to them in practical terms.
• There are doubts as to the lessons learned from past reconciliation programs.
• Reintegration necessitates guarantees for foot soldiers, i.e. that they will not be arrested by Afghan National Security Forces or the International Military.
• The role of the foreign military in this process should be reconsidered given the antagonism and resentment caused by military action in the region, particularly in light of the behavior of Special Operations Forces (SOF).
• Attempts to broker meaningful relations with ‘foreign elements’ of the insurgency would be considered unsustainable.
• The regional dimension of the conflict (e.g. the presence of cross-border sanctuaries) must be taken into consideration when designing a reintegration program.